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Marketing to the Poor:  
An Institutional Model of Exchange in Emerging Markets 
 
Abstract       
In this paper we argue that formal exchanges with poor consumers in emerging markets are hard 
to create and maintain, resulting in widespread market failure. More specifically, in emerging 
markets the institutions required for exchange either function poorly or are entirely absent, 
making it difficult for sellers to deliver affordable and accessible offerings to poor buyers in a 
financially sustainable manner. The marketing challenge thus becomes (1) developing a viable 
business model to facilitate market-based exchanges and (2) shaping the institutions needed to 
implement this business model. Drawing on institutional theory and extending it with insights 
from the marketing and business model innovation literatures, we develop a model of exchange 
in emerging markets. At the heart of our model is the idea that sellers often need to act as 
institutional entrepreneurs in order to create and deliver value when marketing to the poor in 
emerging markets. We discuss the implications of our model for future research on marketing, 
exchange and emerging economies, as well as the implications for managers seeking to market to 
the poor in emerging economies. 
 
Keywords: Emerging markets, poor consumers, marketing exchange  
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Marketing is the “social and managerial process by which individuals and groups obtain what 
they need and want through creating and exchanging products and values with others." 
Marketing is the “process by which companies create value for customers and build strong 
customer relationships in order to capture value from customers in return.” 
         Kotler et al. (2008) 
At its core, marketing is the study of how firms create and maintain exchanges with customers 
(Bagozzi 1974, 1975; Hunt 1983; Houston and Gassenheimer 1987; Vargo and Lusch 2004). 
Several decades of research have resulted in an impressive body of knowledge about how 
marketers should and do create and maintain such exchanges. Almost all of this knowledge, 
however, is based either implicitly or explicitly on a study of marketing in developed economies. 
Very little work has examined how firms create and capture value in emerging economies and 
virtually no work examines how this is done among the poorest segments of those economies 
(see Viswanathan, Rosa and Roth 2010).  
Yet, over 2.5 billion people—nearly half the world’s population—live on less than $2 a day. 
Our understanding of how to market to the majority of the world’s inhabitants is negligible, and 
the field of marketing is impoverished by its lack of knowledge about such issues of macro 
importance (see Mick 2007). Moreover, marketing to the poor in emerging markets poses 
significant challenges that do not exist in developed economies (see Mahajan and Banga 2006 
and Wu 2013). For instance, the institutions required for the creation and maintenance of 
exchanges are often non-existent or fragmented in emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu 2000). 
Specifically, these markets frequently lack the institutions that help with assessing customer 
preferences (e.g., market research firms that specialize on poor segments) and responding to 
customer preferences (e.g., the absence of a distribution and sales infrastructure that reaches the 
poor) (Prahalad 2010). The attempt to create and maintain exchanges with the poor in emerging 
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economies therefore requires a different approach to marketing than in developed economies (see 
Pauwels, Erguncu and Yldirim 2013). 
In this paper, we develop a model to examine the creation and maintenance of exchanges 
with the poor in emerging economies. To do so, we first explore why marketing to the poor in 
emerging markets entails a unique set of challenges relative to marketing in developed 
economies. We then argue that responding to these unique challenges (e.g., the lack of 
institutions that facilitate formal exchange) requires the creation of new business models that 
deliver an attractive value proposition to poor consumers in a financially viable and sustainable 
manner. Finally, we show how implementing such business models requires institutional 
entrepreneurship, namely working with existing institutions to create an environment that 
enables the business model and hence exchange to succeed. In sum, we show that marketers 
facilitate exchange in emerging economies by molding and re-molding existing fragmentary 
institutions or creating new institutions to deliver a value proposition in a financially viable 
manner.  
Given the relative newness of the phenomenon we are studying, and the lack of marketing 
theory in this area, our focus in this paper is on initiating theory development rather than 
assessing, enhancing or testing theory (Bansal and Clelland 2004; Cohen and Dean 2005; see 
Darden 1991; Pollock and Rindova 2003; 2010). As such, following Yadav (2010) we employ 
multiple strategies for such theory development. Specifically, bringing institutional theory to 
bear on the phenomenon of creating and facilitating exchange with the poor in emerging markets 
enables us to draw analogies, invoke theory types, exploit interrelations, and move to new levels 
of analysis in order to spur theory development. Institutional theory is an established conceptual 
approach in sociology and organization science that has been applied to a range of social and 
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technological contexts but seldom explicitly to exchanges involving the world’s poor (see 
Battilana and Dorado 2010, and Tracey and Phillips 2011). However, as we show below, by 
combining institutional theory with existing knowledge in marketing and innovation, we are able 
to shed a great deal of light on the phenomenon of exchange with the poor. In particular, 
adopting an institutional lens allows us to consider the buyer-seller dyad in the context of the 
broader social processes within which innovation and exchange take place, thus helping us to 
draw analogies, exploit interrelations and incorporate multiple levels of analysis in our 
theorizing.  
By building a framework that is designed to increase our understanding of marketing to the 
poor in emerging markets, we make three main contributions. First, we extend existing 
marketing theory to include a wider set of conditions, namely those that exist among poor 
segments in emerging economies. While a small number of marketing scholars have begun to 
consider the distinctive challenges of marketing in emerging markets (e.g., Baker 2009; 
Viswanathan Rosa and Roth 2010), our understanding of marketing in this context remains 
limited. In developing our arguments, we respond to calls for more conceptual work in marketing 
and for marketing to broaden its relevance (see Kohli 2009; Yadav 2010).  
Second, we develop and integrate with marketing theory the concepts of business model 
innovation and institutional entrepreneurship to build a more systemic and strategic view of 
marketing. These concepts and their accompanying theorizing have become central to the fields 
of strategy and organization theory, enabling those fields to engage with important issues of 
relevance to businesses worldwide (see Garud et al. 2002; Maguire et al. 2004; Zott and Amit 
2008; Baden-Fuller and Morgan 2010; Teece 2010; Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart 2010; 
Thompson and MacMillan 2010; Tracey, Phillips and Jarvis 2010). By engaging with these 
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concepts and building on them from a marketing viewpoint, we respond to calls by leading 
marketers for a focus on strategic and macro rather than merely tactical elements of marketing 
theory and methods (see Reibstein, Day and Wind 2009; Kumar 2004; Vargo and Lusch 2004; 
Varadarajan 2010; Day 1992; Mick 2007). We also hope, in the process, to forestall the ceding 
of terrain to cognate disciplines like strategy and organization theory, especially in areas that fall 
squarely within the purview of marketing.  
Third, our framework has practical implications for firms seeking to engage poor consumers 
in emerging economies. Given the large numbers of such consumers, and their increasing ability 
and desire to consume, marketing to these segments offers firms from both developed and 
emerging economies the potential for substantial future growth, but also presents them with some 
severe difficulties. Specifically, while multinationals from developed economies stand to gain 
new sources of revenue from marketing to the poor in emerging markets, they also face 
significant challenges due to their relative lack of knowledge of such segments (Prahalad 2010). 
Conversely, while domestic firms from emerging economies have a relative advantage in terms 
of knowledge about these segments, they face equally significant challenges in scaling up their 
solutions to achieve a profitable scale and scope (Anderson, Markides and Martin 2010). This 
paper therefore has the potential to help marketers of both types of firms to overcome the 
challenges they face in creating and capturing value in emerging economies.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly introduce the concepts of 
business models and business model innovation before setting out a framework for studying 
exchange in emerging markets. We employ this framework to examine market failures and the 
challenges involved in creating and maintaining exchanges with the poor in emerging 
economies. Next, we develop an institutional model of exchange with the poor in emerging 
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economies. And we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our model for research and 
practice. 
Business Model Innovation 
The rise of digital technologies and e-commerce has made it necessary for managers and 
academics to rethink traditional ways of doing business. This in turn has led to the coining of the 
concept of a business model, described by Osterwalder et al.  (2005) as a “blueprint” for how to 
run a business. While there is still some dispute regarding how exactly to define a business 
model, there is general agreement that business models: 1) are a new unit of analysis that span 
beyond the firm, 2) provide a more holistic approach to describing how a firm does business, and 
3) focus on both creating and capturing value (see Zott, Amit and Massa 2011). 
Further, the literature on business models is broadly concerned with two issues. First, it is 
concerned with how firms use business models to create and capture value. The focus here is on 
how new technologies require a change in how the business is run in order to enable the creation 
and capture of value from customers (for example, see Mahadevan 2000, Amit and Zott 2001, 
and Daft and Lewin 1993). Second, the literature is concerned with how the business model itself 
drives organizational innovation. The key question here is how business model innovation can 
drive organizational change and renewal, generate new sources of competitive advantage and 
lead to better performance (see for example Mitchell and Coles 2003).  
Most of the growing literature on business models and business model innovation is based on 
business in developed markets. In developed economies, market based exchanges are generally 
supported by well-functioning financial, legal and social institutions, all of which facilitate such 
exchanges. The literature is, however, generally silent on how these concepts apply (or not) to 
emerging markets. Indeed, for reasons we elaborate on below, we argue that the existing 
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literature is less applicable to firms operating in emerging markets. Specifically, emerging 
markets differ from developed markets in two important ways. First, they are characterized by a 
large proportion of their populations living and working in the informal economy: this means 
that most consumers have low incomes, typically earn and spend on a daily basis, and operate 
beyond the reach of formal institutions such as banks and courts. Second, emerging markets 
either lack or have poorly functioning institutions that facilitate market based exchanges. The 
combination of large numbers of informal economy consumers and poorly functioning 
institutions means that emerging economies are often characterized by market failures in core 
areas such as energy, health, education and finance. Thus, firms that operate in emerging markets 
face particular challenges in creating and capturing value through market based exchanges. We 
argue, therefore, that the nature of business models needed to succeed in emerging markets 
differs from those in developed economies. We also argue that the process by which firms 
develop and implement these business models differs from the process needed in developed 
economies.  
In the next section, we focus on the causes of market failure in emerging markets. We use 
this as a basis to develop a theoretical model of how firms can implement business model 
innovations to overcome these market failures and create viable exchanges particularly with the 
low-income consumers that form the majority of customers in emerging markets. In this context, 
we define business model innovation as finding a way to deliver an attractive value proposition 
to poor consumers in a financially viable and sustainable manner (see Prahalad, 2010; Anderson 
and Markides 2007; Anderson, Markides and Martin 2010). Specifically, this involves 
innovations in how the firm generates revenues while managing its costs.  
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Exchange in Emerging Markets: A Model of Exchange and Market Failures 
We draw on existing research in marketing to develop a general framework for the study of 
exchange (see Figure 1). In identifying the key elements in the process of exchange we 
distinguish between focal and contextual elements. The focal elements of exchange include the 
seller, the buyer, and the offering itself (the marketing mix). The contextual elements include the 
institutions (both formal and informal) that potentially facilitate (or hinder) exchanges between 
sellers and buyers. These include financial institutions such as banks; social institutions such as 
family, clan or caste; cultural institutions such as social norms and practices; legal institutions 
such as the protection of property rights; and marketing institutions such as market research 
agencies, and distribution and sales agents.  
We use this general framework to understand the conditions needed for exchange to take 
place between sellers and buyers from poor segments of emerging markets. Specifically, we 
examine a condition that particularly marks such exchanges: namely, market failure. We discuss 
details of this condition to show how marketing to poor segments in emerging economies differs 
from marketing to consumers in more developed economies. 
Market failure among the poor in emerging markets 
A distinguishing feature of the economic life of poor consumers in emerging economies is the 
prevalence of market failure for even basic needs such as financial services, energy and 
healthcare. For instance, some 2.2 billion adults in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle 
East have no access to formal banking facilities (Chaia et al. 2009). Similar numbers of people 
live without access to the electricity grid and therefore do not benefit from regular sources of 
lighting and energy (Tanaka, Kjorven and Yumkella 2010). Consequently, poor consumers have 
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to rely on informal sources to supply these needs, leading to sub-optimal outcomes such as 
irregular supply, poor quality of supply or high prices (see Hammond et al. 2007).  
We define market failure as a situation in which there is inefficient allocation of goods and 
services in a market (see Ledyard 2008). This means that there exist other forms of exchange 
which would leave buyers better off than the existing forms of exchange. But what explains this 
kind of market failure on a grand scale in emerging markets? More specifically, why do formal 
market exchanges for so many essential goods and services fail to occur among poor consumers 
in emerging economies? Drawing on the framework above, we argue that such market failure 
could be due to factors that operate on either the demand or supply side, involving both focal and 
contextual elements of exchange. See Table 1a and Table 1b for details of causes of market 
failures for the examples discussed in this paper. 
Demand side reasons for market failure 
Assuming that the need for basic services such as finance, energy and healthcare exists, there are 
three main reasons for market failure from the point of view of buyers: lack of awareness, lack of 
accessibility and lack of affordability (see Prahalad 2010; Anderson and Markides 2007; 
Anderson, Markides and Martin 2010; Kashyap and Raut 2006; Mahajan 2008; Mahajan and 
Banga 2006).  
First, buyers may not be aware of the existence of a market offerings that better satisfies their 
needs or how an existing market offering is used. Given the relative lack of marketing 
institutions such as media and advertising services targeted at these segments, poor consumers 
are likely to be relatively uninformed about the range of existing market solutions. Although the 
rapid spread of satellite television coupled with the longstanding prevalence of radio services 
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among the poor mean that awareness is becoming less of a hindrance to exchange, it is certainly 
more difficult for poor consumers in emerging economies to learn about possible market 
solutions than their counterparts in developed economies. An example of this can be seen in 
India where 27% of all deaths occur with no medical attention at the time of death (Sivakumar 
2015). This is to a great extent because the poor are unaware of services they can avail of in a 
medical emergency. For instance, they are very unlikely to be aware of an emergency number to 
call, partly because there is the lack of a national equivalent to a 911 facility. Further, the poor 
often associate ambulance services with the transportation of deceased patients rather than for 
medical care which might prevent death, and therefore often avoid calling ambulance services 
(see Johar and Harries 2010).  
Second, even if poor consumers are aware of market offerings to satisfy their needs, they 
might not be able to access such solutions easily (Mahajan and Banga 2006). For example, in the 
case of banks the relative lack of infrastructure often means that bank branches are few and far 
between in the rural areas where the bulk of the world’s poor live (see Basu and Srivastava 
2005). The lack of accessibility also affects the healthcare industry. India, for instance, has 20 
million blind people, of whom 80% are visually impaired due to curable cataracts. This in turn is 
because two thirds of the country’s eye care infrastructure is concentrated in urban areas, leaving 
rural areas (where the majority of the population lives) without access to adequate eye care (see 
Chaudhary et al. 2012; Rangan 2009; Karamchandami, Kubzansky and Frandano 2009). 
Finally, even if poor consumers are aware of better market offerings and are able to access 
them, they might not be able to afford such offerings. In the case of financial services, for 
instance, the monthly management fee that poor consumers must pay to keep a bank account 
open might not justify the potential benefits of such a service (see Dupas and Robinson 2010). 
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Or again, in East Africa, because accessing electricity from the grid is often impossible, large 
parts of the population are forced to spend 20% of their income on kerosene solely for lighting.  
Taken together, the relative lack of institutions in emerging markets that enable exchange are 
likely to result in poor consumers frequently being unable to enter into formal exchanges with 
sellers of market offerings. 
Supply side reasons for market failure 
From the viewpoint of suppliers, there are three main reasons for market failure in exchanges 
involving poor consumers in emerging markets: lack of awareness of a given market opportunity, 
lack of the means to reach poor consumers, and the lack of an economical means of initiating and 
fulfilling exchange with such consumers (Prahalad, 2010; Anderson and Markides 2007; 
Anderson, Markides and Martin 2010; Kashyap and Raut 2006; Mahajan 2008; Mahajan and 
Banga 2006). 
First, sellers might not be aware of the market opportunity for their offerings among poor 
consumers. Given the relative lack of marketing institutions such as market research agencies 
that specialize in these segments, sellers may have limited knowledge of the nature and extent of 
the market opportunity offered by poor consumers in emerging markets. In Mexico, for example, 
34% of the population lives in poor quality housing. CEMEX, the country’s largest producer of 
building materials, realized that this segment represented a large proportion of their end-users 
with whom they had never directly interacted and who they therefore knew very little about. In 
order to reach this large untapped market, the company had to invest heavily in market research 
to better understand the needs of this segment (see Segel et al. 2006; London and Lee 2006; 
London, Parker and Korona 2012). 
13 
 
Second, even if sellers are aware of the market opportunity, they might not be able to reach 
these consumers easily. The remoteness of many of the world’s poor from urban centers, 
combined with the relative lack of distribution and sales infrastructure in emerging economies, 
means that reaching poor consumers is likely to be very difficult if not impossible in many cases. 
In Asia and Africa, multinational firms in sectors like fast moving consumer goods, face a huge 
supply chain challenge in reaching upwards of 50% of the population that lives in remote rural 
areas. In India, for instance, Unilever faces the twin challenge of poor transport infrastructure 
and over 300,000 small villages dispersed across the country; taken together these challenges 
make traditional supply chain structures economically unviable (see Rangan and Rajan 2007).  
Finally, even if sellers are aware of market opportunities among poor consumers and are able 
to reach them, they might not be able to do so in an economical way. The cost of conducting 
market research on such consumers, developing a solution to meet their needs, and delivering 
this solution to remote locations might be higher than the likely returns from such exchanges. 
Going back to eye care in India, the World Bank estimates that over $200 million is needed 
yearly to expand and build eye care infrastructure to the required level. Even large multinationals 
often do not have the financial resources needed to reach out to poor consumers in a financially 
viable manner (see Chaudhary et al. 2012, Rangan 2009; Karamchandami, Kubzansky and 
Frandano 2009). 
Taken together, the relative lack of institutions that enable exchange with poor consumers in 
emerging markets is likely to mean that sellers are frequently unable or unwilling to enter into 
such exchanges, resulting in market failure. 
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Business Model Innovation in Emerging Markets 
Given the significant barriers to exchange that exist on both the demand and supply sides of the 
buyer-seller dyad, the question then arises as to how, if at all, exchanges involving poor 
consumers in emerging markets might be facilitated. How, for instance, might a persistent firm 
or entrepreneur overcome such barriers to enable these exchanges to occur? We argue that 
initiating and fulfilling exchanges with poor consumers in emerging markets requires business 
model innovation, namely finding a way to deliver an attractive value proposition to poor 
consumers in a financially viable and sustainable manner (see Prahalad, 2010; Anderson and 
Markides 2007; Anderson, Markides and Martin 2010). We now discuss examples of companies 
that corrected market failures in emerging markets through business model innovation (see Table 
2 for a summary of all business model innovations discussed in the paper). 
Business model innovation to address market failure due to affordability 
Aravind Eye Hospitals offer an example of business model innovation focused on addressing the 
challenge of preventable blindness in India (see Prahalad 2004). The key obstacle that the 
founder of the hospital network, Dr Govindappa Venkataswamy, faced was the high cost of 
starting and operating such hospitals, which in turn made them unaffordable to most consumers. 
To overcome these obstacles Dr. Venkataswamy reinvented the cataract surgery business model. 
Instead of using a cost-based approach to pricing, he set the price of his service based on the 
economic stratum of the community he served: those who could afford the full price, paid it; 
those who couldn’t, got the service at a reduced rate or even free. He then worked backwards 
from what people could pay to focus on ways of reducing the cost structure to fit the average 
price.  
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To reduce the cost structure, he focused on one main type of surgery, namely cataract 
surgery: the main cause of blindness in India. This allowed him to focus on reducing fixed costs 
through reproducibility (i.e., standardizing the process to reduce the core skills and discretionary 
elements needed). This in turn allowed him to reduce surgery time from 30 minutes to 10 
minutes. Further, he found ways to ensure that the level and quality of surgery received by 
paying versus non-paying customers was the same. For instance, by having doctors rotate 
between paying and non-paying wards, he ensured that the quality of surgery did not vary across 
patients. Aravind’s business model innovation can therefore be summarized as: 1) the adoption 
of the assembly line approach (i.e., high volumes, low margins) to cataract surgery, and 2) 
pricing the service based on the economic stratum of the consumer. Finally, it is worth noting 
that the market failure in this example, caused by the lack of government resources, has been 
solved through business model innovation on the part of a private enterprise.  
Business model innovation to address market failure due to lack of awareness 
As previously noted, 34% of Mexico’s population faces a housing deficit. Homes for this large 
section of the population are often either incomplete or poorly built. CEMEX, Mexico’s biggest 
producer of building material, realized that the people affected by this housing deficit were end 
users of CEMEX products, and yet the company knew almost nothing about them. To address 
this issue, CEMEX issued a “Declaration of Ignorance” to publicly acknowledge their limited 
knowledge and to initiate actions to remedy the problem. In 1998, CEMEX launched an initiative 
called Patrimony Hoy (“Personal Property Today” in Spanish) which began by conducting 
extensive market research to better understand customer behaviors and needs (see Segel et al. 
2006; London and Lee 2006; London, Parker and Korona 2012).  
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There were two key findings of this research. First, poor consumers often just lack the 
financial means to access adequate building material. Second, even when poor families were able 
to afford some of the building materials needed, they often faced unexpected financial hardship 
that forced them to halt the building process, leading to degradation and waste of the purchased 
materials due to lack of adequate storage facilities.  
In response to the first finding, CEMEX innovated and changed their business model to 
better serve and meet the needs of their poor customers. They developed a product that gave poor 
families direct access to building materials as well as technical support. They also gave families 
access to different financing plans, ranging from micro-credit to micro-saving, based on their 
needs and income. In response to the second finding, CEMEX also offered families access to 
storage facilities, in case they ran into financial difficulties and needed to pause the project for a 
period of time. 
In order to make the business model financially viable, CEMEX had to think about 
sustainable revenue streams and cost reduction mechanisms. The company’s sustainable revenue 
stream came from the service fees they charged the customer, which were often covered by the 
different financing schemes offered to the customer. In order to drive down costs CEMEX had to 
negotiate new deals with distributers participating in the program (see Segel et al. 2006; London 
and Lee 2006; London, Parker and Korona 2012).  
Business model innovation to address market failure due to the inaccessibility of poor consumers  
Over 70% of consumers in India live in villages dispersed all over the country. Given the poor 
transportation infrastructure in India, reaching these consumers is not only costly but also 
difficult using traditional supply chain structures. To address this challenge, Unilever India 
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developed a new business model titled Project Shakti. The project focused on driving down the 
cost of long, complex supply chains, by providing female entrepreneurs in rural India with access 
to micro-credit that they could use to purchase Unilever products to sell in their villages. This 
project not only reduced the cost of reaching poor consumers in rural villages, it also created 
employment for thousands of Shakti entrepreneurs whose income was doubled as a result. The 
key challenge in making this business model work was pricing the products at a level that 
guaranteed a high enough margin to keep the Shakti entrepreneurs motivated, while at the same 
time not causing conflict with other channel members (see Rangan and Rajan 2007).  
While finding a viable business model is crucial, equally important is implementing the 
business model to facilitate and maintain exchange over the long term (Anderson and Markides 
2007; Anderson, Markides and Martin 2010). Because of the fragmented nature of the 
institutional environment, however, implementing new business models in emerging markets is 
likely to require institutional entrepreneurship – the purposive reshaping of existing institutions 
or the creation of new ones – on the part of sellers. Specifically, to create and facilitate exchange 
in emerging economies, marketers need to work with the existing institutional context to forge a 
set of institutional arrangements that allows them to deliver a value proposition in a financially 
viable and sustainable manner. We now turn to a detailed discussion of the role of institutional 
entrepreneurship in facilitating the implementation of business model innovation, and hence 
exchange, in the context of marketing to the poor in emerging economies. 
Exchange in Emerging Markets: An Institutional Perspective 
 In this section we start by drawing on organization theory to build a set of institutional 
arguments (see Dacin et al. 2002, DiMaggio and Powell 1991, Greenwood et al. 2008) designed 
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to explain how sellers introduce fundamentally new business models in an emerging market 
context. We then introduce in turn the three phases of our proposed institutional model of 
exchange (see Figure 2), with reference to a variety of examples, to show how businesses have 
engaged in institutional entrepreneurship in order to implement business model innovations that 
addressed or fixed a market failure of the emerging market in which the firm was operating (see 
Table 3 for a summary of all examples). And finally, we use the example of solar lighting 
solutions to provide a comprehensive illustration of how our institutional model of exchange 
functions in practice. 
Implementing Business Model Innovation: An Institutional Perspective 
Institutional theory was originally concerned with the ways in which institutions constrain 
behavior and promote organizational conformity to dominant norms and practices. Over the last 
two decades, however, institutional analysis has become increasingly concerned with explaining 
institutional change, with a particular focus on the role of firms and other actors in manipulating 
the institutional context in which they operate (e.g., Garud et al. 2002; Greenwood and Hinings 
1996; Hargadon and Douglas 2001).  
The notion of institutional entrepreneurship – the “activities of actors who leverage 
resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones” (Maguire et al. 2004 p. 657) – 
has had an especially significant impact on the institutional literature, providing a powerful 
conceptual tool for researchers seeking to understand the role of strategic choice in institutional 
change. Institutional entrepreneurs might be individuals (Tracey et al. 2010), firms and other 
types of organization (Garud et al. 2002), or groups of individuals and/or organizations such as 
social movements (Hiatt et al. 2009). The key issue, however, is that these actors have a set of 
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strategic objectives that they seek to achieve by altering the institutional arrangements in which 
they are embedded. The term institutional work is used to describe the particular strategies 
institutional entrepreneurs use when seeking to create, maintain or disrupt existing institutional 
arrangements in order to achieve a particular objective (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). 
These theoretical developments have underpinned the emergence of a significant body of 
research designed to explain how firms are able to influence their environments and engage in 
innovation. In this paper, we adapt this work to explain how sellers implement business model 
innovation in emerging markets in order to create and maintain formal exchanges with the poor. 
Our basic argument is that sellers need to operate in an institutional context that enables them to 
deliver a value proposition in a financially viable and sustainable manner. However, given the 
nature of emerging markets outlined above, sellers may be unable to do so within existing 
institutional configurations. This means that to innovate in this context sellers may have to 
engage in deliberate action designed to strategically engender changes in their institutional 
environment. In other words, a ‘solution’ to the problems of poorly functioning markets in 
emerging economies may be for sellers to act as institutional entrepreneurs.  
We develop a model (see Process of Institutional Change in Figure 2) that builds on prior 
work from institutional theory in its interface with the technology management literature (see 
Van de Ven and Garud 1993; Van de Ven et al. 1999; Van de Ven et al. 2000a; Van de Ven 
2000b; Garud et al. 2003; Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006). Drawing on a key part of this body 
of work (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006), our model comprises four institutional change 
processes – which we consider as four distinct types of institutional work – that institutional 
entrepreneurs need to engage in to affect institutional change: (1) framing; frames are shared 
interpretive schemes – or systems of meaning – that help actors make sense of the world and 
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provide templates for organizing (McAdam et al. 1996), (2) network construction, which is a 
political process characterized by competition and co-operation between the relevant actors in a 
given institutional setting (see Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006). (3) enactment of institutional 
arrangements, which entails working with powerful state and other regulatory actors in order to 
create or enact the formal and informal institutions necessary for a given business model 
innovation to become viable, and (4) legitimation through collective action processes, where 
legitimation involves proving that the business model works by getting consumers and other 
stakeholders committed to the new form of exchange and ensuring that the resources needed to 
sustain the model continue to flow toward it.  
An Institutional Model of Exchange in Emerging Markets 
We will now introduce our institutional model of exchange (see Figure 2) in which we argue that 
the process of creating and maintaining exchanges with poor consumers in emerging markets 
unfolds in three phases. In phase 1 buyers and sellers operate in a situation of market failure in 
which exchange is inefficient, partial or non-existent. In phase 2 sellers implement the four steps 
discussed above (framing, network construction, enactment of institutional arrangements and 
legitimation through collective action) to implement their business model by working to bring 
about the institutional change needed to support it. And finally phase three is a result of the 
successful implementation of the proposed business model which leads to buyers and sellers 
operating in a situation in which formal exchange occurs and a formal market exists. We will 
now discuss each of the three phases in more details with examples illustrating the theoretical 
concept. 
21 
 
In phase 1, buyers and sellers operate in a situation of market failure in which exchange is 
inefficient, partial or non-existent. This is largely because the institutions needed to facilitate 
exchange are non-existent or fragmentary. To create the conditions for exchange, sellers need to 
develop a business model that delivers value for buyers in a financially viable and sustainable 
way.  
Take Kenya’s banking and remittance industry as an example. In 2006, the industry was 
characterized by market failure leading to insufficient exchange: 74% of the population was 
unbanked and 85% of the population was sending remittances using informal and unsafe 
methods (for instance, a commonly used method was sending cash with friends, family or even 
complete strangers such as bus drivers). This led to a number of problems: money would not be 
delivered on time, or bus drivers might charge extensive fees for the transfer, or the money 
would get lost on the way without the sender or receiver having any way of holding the courier 
to account. The only safe alternative available at that time was Western Union, which used to 
charge up to 40% transfer fees, making this service expensive and unaffordable. 
To address and fix the market failure and to create a better environment for exchange, Nick 
Hughes, head of Global Payment Solutions at Vodafone, developed M-PESA (M- for mobile and 
Pesa being Swahili for money): a service that allowed customers of Safaricom (Vodafone’s 
subsidiary in Kenya) to deposit and transfer money using their mobile phones. The value 
delivered to customers was that the service offers an affordable, safe and accessible mode of 
money transfers and remittances. The service also proved to be economically viable: it increased 
the company’s market share and revenues and built strong customer loyalty. Further, Hughes 
was able to reduce cost by 1) using a vast network of independent agents (often mom and pop 
retailers) to cash the money, 2) using big data to guarantee a sustained cash flow to the agents’ 
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network and 3) raising 50% of the initial capital investment needed from DFID (Britain’s aid 
agency) (see Duke and Chandy 2011; Jack and Suri 2013; Sadoulet and Furdelle 2014). 
In Phase 2, sellers implement the business model by working to bring about the institutional 
change needed to support it. This process requires sellers to frame the problem and solution 
appropriately; construct networks that facilitate the implementation of the business model; enact 
institutional arrangements to put in place the regulations, resources, demand and proprietary 
activities needed to support the business model; and achieve legitimacy for the business model to 
ensure that it is sustainable in the long run.We now discuss the specific steps that institutional 
entrepreneurs like Nick Hughes go through to implement and guarantee the success of their 
business model innovation. 
Phase 2: Step 1: Framing 
The first type of institutional work that sellers in emerging markets need to engage in when 
seeking to implement innovative business models is framing. Frames are shared interpretive 
schemes – or systems of meaning – that help actors make sense of the world and provide 
templates for organizing (McAdam et al. 1996). Stable institutional contexts are characterized by 
dominant collective action frames, which are taken for granted by the constituent actors in that 
context. However, institutional entrepreneurs can challenge dominant frames through the 
development of strategically constructed alternatives. This involves institutional entrepreneurs 
critiquing current institutional arrangements and specifying their shortcomings, then proposing 
an alternative set of arrangements that challenge these shortcomings.  
For example, the entrepreneurial firm trying to sell solar lighting solutions to the rural poor in 
India (see Miller 2009) first had to challenge a dominant frame which assumed that the lighting 
needs of those off the electricity grid could only be met by the state or aid agencies investing 
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large amounts of money in expanding the central grid. This firm then needed to propose an 
alternative arrangement that involved small-scale, decentralized solutions such as those 
involving solar technology, i.e., a new business model. Further, while the selling of solar 
technologies in developed economies typically involves an appeal to sustainability and “green” 
agendas, the entrepreneurial firm in India found such framing to be less effective in the context 
of its target market. Instead, the firm found that its discourse had to be primarily centered on the 
fundamental need for affordable lighting solutions and only secondarily about the sustainability 
benefits of solar technology (see Miller 2009). 
Institutional entrepreneurs need to engage in three main framing tasks when seeking to alter a 
particular system of meaning (Benford and Snow 2000). The first task is diagnostic framing, 
which involves the articulation of a particular problem, and an attempt to identify the causes of 
that problem. In the context of selling solar lighting to the rural poor in India, this required the 
entrepreneur to identify and highlight the huge unmet need that those off the electricity grid have 
for affordable lighting, along with the fact that expanding the grid to reach 600,000 Indian 
villages was not a viable solution, even over the medium to long term (Miller 2009).  
The second task is prognostic framing, which involves articulating a potential solution to the 
problem that has been identified, and proposing a specific strategy or set of strategies for how the 
solution might be implemented. There is clearly a close relationship between diagnostic and 
prognostic framing; thus “the identification of specific problems and causes tends to constrain 
the possible ‘reasonable’ solutions and strategies advocated” (Benford and Snow 2000, p. 616). 
In the context of selling solar lighting to the rural poor in India, prognostic framing meant that 
the entrepreneurial firm had to propose a solution built around a de-centralized strategy in which 
households off the grid are able to generate their own power rather than rely on expensive and 
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unlikely outcomes such as the expansion of the electricity grid (Miller 2009). Identifying the 
unworkable nature of a centralized solution (expanding the electricity grid through large 
government investment) at least partially enabled the entrepreneurial firm to come up with a 
decentralized solution to the problem.  
The third core framing task is motivational framing. This provides the rationale or 
justification for a particular course of action through which institutional entrepreneurs can 
galvanize support and convince others to commit time and effort toward a particular goal. Here 
the outline of a clear mission combined with a workable business model become crucial. Again, 
in the case of selling solar lighting solutions, the company selling the solution made it its mission 
to prove 1) that poor people could afford sustainable technology and 2) that the company could 
make a profit from selling such technology to the poor (Miller 2009). 
Nick Hughes used diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing to convince the top 
management of Vodafone’s HQ in the UK to invest approximately $3 million into M-PESA. 
VF’s management had two main objections to the mobile money solution: 1) M-PESA was too 
far from Vodafone’s core business (i.e., voice and data), and 2) VF’s top management wanted to 
see return on investment in the short run to justify the high initial capital investment required. 
Both objections are typical of a firm like Vodafone which is accountable to a large number of 
stakeholders and needs to justify to any risk that the company is taking. However, this mindset 
and way of operating was the biggest obstacle in the way of M-PESA and could have killed the 
idea very early on. 
Despite this, Nick Hughes decided to continue to pursue his idea and change the institutional 
arrangements standing in his way. Instead of depending on Vodafone to finance 100% of the 
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project, Hughes legitimized his idea by securing 50% of the required funding from DFID (the 
UK’s international aid agency) and asking Vodafone to match this funding. DFID as an 
institution operates with a different mindset: because they have a better understanding of 
emerging markets, they understand the time it might take for such a project to be implemented 
and show a return on investment.  
Securing the DFID funding helped Hughes with diagnostic framing in the sense that it showed 
Vodafone’s top management that Hughes’ articulation of the problem was accurate, that the idea 
was promising and that the problem lay in their short term focus. It also helped in prognostic 
framing in the sense that securing the DFID funding solved half the problem and showed 
Vodafone that the M-PESA idea was legitimate. This in turn motivated Vodafone’s top 
management to agree to fund the remaining 50% of the project and give Nick Hughes more time 
to show results. At the time, Nick Hughes was a pioneer in looking for funding from an aid 
agency for the implementation of a new business idea (see Duke and Chandy 2011; Jack and Suri 
2013; Sadoulet and Furdelle 2014).  
Phase 2: Step 2: Network Construction 
The second type of institutional work that sellers must perform when implementing business 
model innovation in emerging markets is network construction. Most studies of institutional 
entrepreneurship show that it is a political process characterized by competition and co-operation 
between the relevant actors in a given institutional setting (see Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006). 
For example, Levy and Scully (2007, p. 985) describe institutional entrepreneurs as “Modern 
Princes” who use their skills to create networks in order to “outmanoeuvre dominant actors with 
superior resources”. Similarly, Wijen and Ansari (2007) note that institutional entrepreneurship 
poses a “collective action problem” in which actors need to balance their own individual interests 
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with co-operation while at the same time guarding against actors who seek to free-ride on the 
efforts of others.  
While some studies have focused on institutional entrepreneurs with obviously dominant 
positions (e.g., Hoffman 1999), others have focused on the ways in which actors with apparently 
marginal positions have helped to shape new institutional configurations (e.g., Hensmans 2003; 
Maguire et al. 2004). Regardless of their relative power and the nature of their resources, 
however, all institutional entrepreneurs are required to construct strategic networks to achieve 
their objectives.  
The role of networks is particularly significant in the context of exchange with the poor in 
emerging markets (Anderson and Markides 2007; Anderson, Markides and Martin 2010). The 
absence of existing institutions that facilitate distribution and after sales service, as well as the 
lack of institutions that ensure consumer education and protection, mean that sellers in these 
markets must develop an ecosystem of partners to help make their products and services 
accessible and acceptable to consumers (see Mahajan 2008; Mahajan and Banga 2006). Given 
the remoteness of these consumers, it is often the case that marginal rather than dominant actors 
have a major role to play in the creation and functioning of these networks. The importance of 
networks holds for a range of industries, including fast moving consumer goods, cellular phones 
and financial services.  
In financial services, the many different forms of microfinance have involved the creation of a 
network of self-help groups (Yunus, Moingeon and Lehmann-Ortega 2010). Each self-help 
group is itself a network of like-minded women without access to credit who pool their resources 
to invest, lend to and borrow from each other. Moreover, fast moving consumer goods 
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manufacturers like Unilever now engage with networks of such self-help groups to distribute 
their products to remote consumers in an efficient and cost effective way (see Rangan and Rajan 
2007). Indeed, working with microfinance institutions provides Unilever with access to self-help 
groups and their members. Under such arrangements, individual members of self-help groups 
may take loans from their group to buy material from Unilever which they then sell on to 
consumers in their local communities, thus acting as semi-formal members of a Unilever “retail” 
network. Finally, cellular phone service providers in emerging markets, such as Safaricom in 
Kenya or Bharti Airtel in India, have over time worked with a large number of “mom-and-pop” 
retailers to create a vast retail network that serves consumers in far-flung rural communities (see 
Prahalad and Mashelkar 2010). The successful adoption of mobile telephony in emerging 
markets has been largely a consequence of the development and use of such distribution 
networks.  
Phase 2: Step 3: Enactment of Institutional Arrangements 
Sellers often need to work with powerful state and other regulatory actors in order to create or 
enact the formal and informal institutions necessary for a given business model innovation to 
become viable. This may involve deliberately creating conflict between existing institutional 
structures and processes.  
The institutional infrastructure needed for creating and implementing innovation typically 
comprises four building blocks (see Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006; Van de Ven and Garud 
1993; Van de Ven et al. 1999). The first is institutional regulations. These are the rules created 
by the government agencies, trade bodies, and technical communities that regulate a given 
product or technology, and whose approval is required for its introduction. These actors must be 
persuaded to support the innovation and put the necessary formal institutional arrangements in 
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place if it is to be viable. For instance, in selling financial services to the unbanked poor in 
emerging markets, a key challenge for sellers has been influencing central banks such as the 
Reserve Bank of India or Central Bank of Kenya to enable non-banking entities such as cellular 
phone operators to provide financial services like mobile payments without using the 
intermediation of banks (see The Economic Times 2008).  
Often, the approval and support of these regulatory bodies is what makes or breaks a business 
model in an emerging market. To illustrate the importance of such institutional regulations, 
consider two emerging markets – Kenya and Egypt – where regulatory arrangements made all 
the difference for the success of mobile payment services. After a short but intense battle with 
the Central Bank of Kenya, Safaricom managed to gain their support and approval for the launch 
of M-PESA in 2007. The Central Bank of Kenya interfered very little in determining the number 
of agents allowed to work for M-PESA, as long as certain security measures such as “know-
your-customer” conditions were guaranteed. The vast network of agents enabled by this 
approach was a key factor in the success of M-PESA in Kenya. In Egypt, on the other hand, the 
regulator capped the number of agents allowed per mobile operator at 2000, with very strict 
criteria governing who could be an agent; this in turn led to a concentration of agents in Egypt’s 
main cities, severely limiting the spread and success of the service (see Duke and Chandy 2011; 
Jack and Suri 2013; Sadoulet and Furdelle 2014). 
The second building block is resource endowments, which comprise the basic knowledge 
required to develop the product, the pool of human resources needed for the business model to 
function effectively, as well as the appropriate financial mechanisms required to fund the 
development costs of the new business model. For instance, selling financial services to the 
unbanked poor in Bangladesh required the Grameen Bank to select and train service personnel to 
29 
 
promote, distribute and serve a dispersed and relatively uneducated customer base (Yunus, 
Moingeon and Lehmann-Ortega 2010). It also required the Grameen Bank to work with investors 
to secure the finances needed to put such operations in place (Yunus, Moingeon and Lehmann-
Ortega 2010). Given the relatively untested nature of such markets, securing these resources can 
be a particularly difficult and drawn out process (see Miller 2009). 
In the case of M-PESA, one of the challenges that Nick Hughes faced with his new business 
model was a cash-flow bottleneck. Hughes realized that the flow of remittances was for the most 
part from urban to rural Kenya, which meant that the agents in urban areas had a cash surplus, 
while agents in rural areas suffered from a cash deficit. Leveraging his operations background, 
Hughes developed a sophisticated network of cash distribution between agents according to their 
needs and location. This step was essential in securing the necessary resources to guarantee the 
smooth running and success of the business model (see Duke and Chandy 2011).  
The third building block is consumer demand, which for ‘new to the world’ business models 
does not pre-exist; institutional entrepreneurs are required to raise awareness and stimulate 
demand for their products. In the case of introducing banking to the unbanked, convincing poor 
consumers – who earn and spend on a daily basis – of the benefits of saving, and paying a 
monthly fee for the privilege of doing so, is not a trivial exercise (Dupas and Robinson 2010). 
Educating these consumers and changing their existing patterns of behavior to create the 
necessary demand requires strategic action on the part of entrepreneurial actors and involves 
considerable resources, time and effort.  
The fourth building block is proprietary activities which allow institutional entrepreneurs to 
capture value and create a commercially viable venture through business model innovation. 
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Particularly important in this respect is the creation of complementary assets such as 
manufacturing, marketing and distribution. Again, in the context of bringing financial services to 
the unbanked poor, once sellers have persuaded these consumers to open a bank account, they 
then face the significant challenge of deepening consumers’ use of financial services. Enabling 
such consumers to ascend the financial ladder and move from savings to more sophisticated 
financial instruments such as loans and insurance after initial adoption requires a great deal of 
organization, effort and resources (Yunus, Moingeon and Lehmann-Ortega 2010). For example, 
it requires a salesforce that manages relationships with customers, constantly encouraging them 
to extend their existing custom while also cross-selling new services to them.   
Phase 2: Step 4: Legitimation through Collective Action Processes 
Having framed the ‘problem’ and proposed a possible ‘solution’ in the form of a new business 
model, constructed a network to lobby in favor of that solution, and enacted an appropriate set of 
formal and informal institutional structures within a given emerging market to support it, the 
final type of institutional work required of sellers is the legitimation of the new business model 
through collective action. Thus while framing, network construction and institutional enactment 
lay the groundwork for the actual implementation of the business model, legitimation helps 
secure the long term sustainability of the model. Specifically, legitimation involves proving that 
the business model works by getting consumers and other stakeholders committed to the new 
form of exchange and ensuring that the resources needed to sustain the model continue to flow 
toward it.  
Legitimacy is a foundational concept in institutional theory. While researchers have identified 
many different kinds of legitimacy, we focus on two core types: namely cognitive and 
sociopolitical legitimacy (see Aldrich and Fiol 1994). Cognitive legitimacy refers to the level of 
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public knowledge about a new product, service or process. When actors in a given institutional 
context accept an activity as ‘taken for granted’ and no longer question its existence, the activity 
is said to have high levels of cognitive legitimacy. In the context of microfinance, for instance, 
once the basic model was shown by the Grameen bank to work in Bangladesh, terms such as 
micro-credit, self-help group, and Grameen entered the vocabulary of policymakers and 
investors worldwide (see Pearl and Phillips 2001).  
Sociopolitical legitimacy refers to the extent to which key actors such as government officials 
and legislators, public figures, opinion leaders and the media openly endorse and support a new 
product, service or process. In the context of microfinance, if it began to achieve sociopolitical 
legitimacy when the World Bank and venture capitalists started to invest large sums on such 
schemes worldwide (see Pearl and Phillips 2001), then this process reached its apotheosis when 
Mohammed Yunus and Grameen Bank were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. Cognitive 
and sociopolitical legitimacy are clearly closely related: institutional entrepreneurs need to build 
levels of public knowledge and then gain the support of powerful actors if they are to become 
legitimate and thus highly institutionalized. With respect to microfinance, this symbiotic 
relationship between the two types of legitimacy has clearly existed from the start; for instance, 
the interest and behavior of investors and policymakers have clearly influenced the opinions of 
the media and general public, and vice versa.  
Legitimacy is closely linked to various positive performance outcomes (Bansal and Clelland 
2004; Cohen and Dean 2005; Hannan and Carroll 1992; Pollock and Rindova 2003). 
Specifically, legitimacy has been shown to improve the likelihood of organizational survival and 
resource acquisition (Stuart et al. 1999). In the context of microfinance, the bank that Yunus 
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started in 1976 by lending $27 to a group of families in a village has now become a billion-dollar 
micro-credit venture with more than eight million borrowers in Bangladesh alone. 
In the case of M-PESA the service gained cognitive legitimacy 12 months after its launch 
when its active subscriber numbers increased by 30.6 %, its subscriber market share was 
estimated at 79% and revenue market share was estimated at 83%. Additionally, the service 
spread beyond Kenya’s boundaries: other mobile operators invested and tried to implement the 
service in countries like Tanzania, Uganda and Afghanistan (see Duke and Chandy 2011; Jack 
and Suri 2013; Sadoulet and Furdelle 2014). Yet, the success of M-PESA in Kenya was 
unprecedented. Replications often failed due to barriers in implementing one or more of the 4 
steps of the institutional model of exchange described above (e.g., enacting institutional 
arrangements in Egypt). 
M-PESA gained a clear form of socio-political legitimacy once whole new business models 
started to be based on the service, as when micro-finance institutions started to integrate mobile 
payments into their business models in order to reduce the costs of collecting payments (Jack and 
Suri 2013; Sadoulet and Furdelle 2014). Nick Hughes himself subsequently founded M-Kopa, a 
provider of solar lighting solutions in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The business model of M-
Kopa is only possible because it leverages mobile payments to enable unbanked customers to 
pay off the up-front costs of solar lighting equipment using micropayments in instalments.  
Finally, in Phase 3, buyers and sellers operate in a situation in which formal exchange occurs 
and a formal market exists. Buyers are aware of the seller’s offering and are able to afford and 
access it, while sellers are able to deliver the offering in a financially sustainable manner, thus 
ensuring that the conditions for exchange to happen are met. 
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Overall, the example of M-PESA in Kenya allows us to see in detail how an institutional 
entrepreneur like Nick Hughes might navigate the four stages of our proposed institutional model 
of exchange, altering the realities he initially faced, which were often obstacles in his way. 
Hughes successfully managed to turn around the remittance industry in Kenya from a market 
failure to a market success, while at the same time changing the nature and business model of the 
telecom industry more generally.  
Our proposed institutional model of exchange in emerging markets can help organizations 
devise and implement successful business model innovations to tackle some of the most pressing 
market failures faced by our societies today. In order to demonstrate the practical and theoretical 
insights that the model affords – which have been suggested by the examples threaded though 
the foregoing discussion – the next section examines one case in depth: how a solar 
lightning company in India brought about change and gave thousands of households access to 
clean energy (see Miller 2009). 
An illustration of the Institutional Model of Exchange: The case of solar lighting  
In order to provide a more comprehensive illustration of our proposed Model (see figure 2), 
consider again the case of selling solar lighting solutions to the rural poor in India (see Miller 
2009). In the mid-1990s (Phase 1), the market for such solutions did not exist despite a large 
unmet need: while large numbers of poor consumers were off the electricity grid, formal 
exchanges for alternative energy solutions were rare if not nonexistent. On the buyer side, three 
major factors accounted for this market failure: the lack of affordability, availability and 
awareness. On the seller side, the major reason for market failure was the challenge of delivering 
an affordable and accessible solar lighting solution in a financially viable and sustainable way.  
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The first step for the seller wishing to create such a market was to develop a business model 
that found a way around these obstacles to exchange. A potential business model that would 
achieve this involved creating a network of local entrepreneur-distributors who would use a bank 
loan guaranteed by the seller to buy the solar equipment and batteries; these local entrepreneurs 
would use the equipment to charge the batteries which would then be rented on a daily basis to 
end consumers. With such a model, the local entrepreneurs absorbed the capital cost of the 
equipment and made the solution affordable to end consumers, most of whom earned and spent 
money on a daily basis. The local presence of these entrepreneurs also ensured that the solution 
was available and accessible to end consumers, and provided an opportunity to increase 
awareness.  
While elegant as a potential solution, actually implementing this business model was a far 
greater challenge because the institutions needed for its implementation were fragmentary or 
nonexistent. Thus, in Phase 2 (1995-2005), the seller had to do a great deal of institutional work 
to shape the institutions needed to implement the business model and to create and facilitate 
exchange. First, the seller had to frame the challenge and the proposed solution. This involved 
making the case to relevant stakeholders that the energy needs of those off the electricity grid 
could not be achieved by existing centralized, on-grid solutions but would instead require 
decentralized, off-grid solutions involving new technologies such as solar. Framing also involved 
outlining a business model, like the one above, that would make such a solution possible in a 
financially sustainable way.  
Second, implementing the business model required working to create the necessary networks 
needed to make the business model viable. The major step here was selecting, training and 
financing a network of local entrepreneurs who would act as intermediaries between the seller 
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and end consumers. As described above, the proper selection, training and financing of these 
entrepreneurs ensured the affordability, accessibility and awareness needed to make the business 
model work.  
Third, implementing the business model required a process of institutional enactment 
whereby the seller could secure the resources and formal contracts needed to finance the business 
model and make it financially sustainable. This in turn required working with banks to convince 
them to lend money to people (micro-entrepreneurs) who lacked a credit history in a sector in 
which the banks lacked prior investment experience (i.e., energy and solar technologies).  
Finally, implementing the business model required gaining legitimacy among important 
stakeholders such as investors, government officials, public figures and opinion leaders. 
Achieving such legitimacy in turn required sustained interaction, negotiation and communication 
with these stakeholders to not only ensure that the business model was successfully implemented 
but also to ensure that this success was recognized and celebrated in various quarters.  
Phase 2, namely the process of institutional work needed to implement the business model in 
this context, was difficult and time consuming and took over 10 years of sustained effort to 
realize. It was only after this process was completed that the market entered Phase 3. 
Specifically, it was only around 2005 that the conditions needed for a large number of formal 
exchanges to take place in this sector were finally met and a proper market came into existence 
for solar lighting solutions for the rural poor.  Indeed, by 2005-2006 the seller had installed more 
than 100,000 solar lighting systems and generated sales of $3 million despite the fact that two-
thirds of the firm’s customers lived on less than $4 per day.  Moreover, a number of other players 
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had entered the market, further establishing the legitimacy of the sector and ensuring its viability 
in the long run (Miller 2009). 
Discussion and Conclusion 
We have developed a model designed specifically to understand exchange with poor consumers 
in emerging economies. To do so, we have integrated institutional theory with research in 
marketing and innovation to conceptualize sellers to the poor in emerging markets as 
institutional entrepreneurs who are required to (1) develop new business models, (2) shape the 
institutional environment in order to implement these business models.  The institutional model 
of exchange that we have presented has several implications for research and practice, which we 
discuss in detail below.  
Implications for theory 
By focusing on how sellers create and maintain exchanges with buyers, we extend the existing 
marketing theory of exchange in a more strategic and macro direction. While exchange has 
rightly been identified as a key aspect of marketing (see Bagozzi 1974, 1975; Hunt 1983; 
Houston and Gassenheimer 1987; Vargo and Lusch 2004), the progress of a theory of exchange 
has faltered, perhaps because marketing scholars have adopted a neutral focus between buyers 
and sellers in their theorizing about exchange. Specifically, institutions and the role of the seller 
(i.e., the marketer) in purposefully shaping these institutions to facilitate exchange have seldom 
been the focus of systematic analysis in marketing. Yet, as our model elaborates, the seller has a 
key role to play in making markets, especially in emerging economies. First, it is the seller who 
develops a given business model that creates and captures value for buyers. Second, perhaps 
more importantly, it is the seller who shapes the institutional context that enables the successful 
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implementation of that business model. Extending marketing theory along these lines ensures 
that the market-making role of marketers is better understood and emphasized. It also helps 
ensure that marketing continues to engage with strategic and macro rather than merely tactical 
business issues, and does not cede important conceptual terrain to cognate fields such as strategy 
and organization theory on topics that are so obviously core to marketing as a field (see 
Reibstein, Day and Wind 2009; Kumar 2004; Varadarajan 2010; Day 1992; Mick 2007). 
Our model also extends existing marketing theory to an economically vital context that is 
rarely studied by marketing researchers, namely exchange involving poor consumers in emerging 
markets. By doing so, we call attention to a central characteristic of such contexts, namely 
market failure, and shed light upon when and why exchange happens (and when and why it does 
not).  
Studying such a context not only broadens the range of phenomena to which marketing 
theory applies, it also enriches what we know about more mainstream contexts such as marketing 
to middle to high income consumers in developed economies. Indeed, from a historical 
perspective, now-developed economies were once emerging economies. Specifically, even these 
countries, in earlier phases of their development, faced institutional voids that resulted in market 
failure. However, because most modern business research in general, and marketing research in 
particular, has been conducted in the developed economies of North America and Western 
Europe, our theories have not typically incorporated the role of institutions in facilitating market 
exchanges. It is only now that business and marketing researchers are beginning to study 
emerging markets that the crucial role of institutions and how they are built is coming into view. 
Further, it is also true that some sectors of even developed economies lack appropriate or 
adequate institutions to facilitate market exchanges. “Emerging sectors” such as drones, 
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autonomous vehicles, artificial intelligence, genetic engineering etc., are all so new that 
regulations and other market-facilitating institutions are yet to be formulated even in the West. 
Moreover, even as these institutions are being created in the West, their creation has to contend 
with the existence of existing legacy institutions designed for prior, now outdated technological 
regimes. The new regulations frequently come up against existing, outdated regulations making 
change hard.  
It is here that emerging markets offer interesting new possibilities, even for developed 
economies. Emerging markets, because they are often creating technological infrastructure from 
scratch can leapfrog the West in this process, not only in terms of the physical aspects but also in 
terms of the regulatory institutions. For instance, many emerging economies leapfrogged straight 
to mobile telecommunications almost entirely by-passing a prior land-line phase. They are now 
also using the mobile infrastructure to leapfrog straight into mobile banking without passing 
through the bricks-and-mortar banking phase. It is entirely likely that many developing countries 
might create off-grid renewables infrastructures without ever reaching full electrification through 
a centralized grid. Emerging markets, in creating these technological infrastructures, have also 
been able to leapfrog developed economies in terms of creating regulatory backbones to support 
these new sectors. For instance, the Central Bank of Kenya was able to create a regulatory space 
for a non-banking entity (the mobile telecoms provider Safaricom) to provide financial services 
to unbanked Kenyan citizens. By applying an institutional model to emerging industries in 
developed economies, marketing theorists can begin to formulate a more general theory of 
exchange that applies across economic contexts and income segments. A particularly interesting 
line of enquiry in this regard concerns the relative importance of business model innovation and 
institutional change in emerging relative to developed economies. 
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Finally, our model highlights the type of work that marketers need to perform in creating and 
shaping the institutions needed to make exchange happen. The idea that marketers often act as 
institutional entrepreneurs has rarely been explored (for a recent exception see Humphreys 
2010). In part this is because most marketing knowledge, whether academic or practical, has 
been built in the context of or applied to developed economies where the institutions needed to 
facilitate and maintain exchanges are typically well developed. By focusing on how exchange 
happens in a context where the institutions needed to facilitate exchange are fragmentary or non-
existent we emphasize the importance of incorporating macro-level theorizing into marketing 
research. Marketing research is typically focused at a micro-level of analysis (i.e., the buyer-
seller dyad). As a result, it often fails to take account of broader social processes as well as key 
stakeholders that are central to the exchange process, including actors in the financial, media and 
regulatory domains. Understanding how marketing managers interact with their environment and 
develop relationships with such stakeholders is arguably as important as understanding how 
marketing mangers interact and develop relationships with business customers and end 
consumers (see Kotler 1986). 
Implications for method 
The model we outline in this paper offers several methodological implications for marketing 
research. First, the complex, interdependent and emerging nature of the phenomena we study—
exchanges with the poor, business model innovation and institutional entrepreneurship—suggest 
the need for significant grounded research into how market failure is overcome and formal 
exchange with the poor is created and maintained across geographical, sectoral and cultural 
contexts. This in turn suggests the need for deep ethnographies in order to build a more complete 
theory of exchange that not only examine the buyer side of the exchange equation (see 
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Thompson, Rindfleisch and Arsel 2006; Fournier 1998; Holt 2002) but also that of the seller. 
The use of ethnographic techniques to understand seller rather than buyer behavior is a relatively 
undeveloped area of marketing methodologically (see Viswanathan, Rosa and Roth 2010; 
Gebhardt, Carpenter and Sherry 2006) and our model provides a framework to help guide such 
research.   
Second, our model suggests significant opportunities for quantitative research into how 
markets for the poor are created and the impact that these markets have on the welfare of poor 
consumers. Specifically, given that business models for creating exchanges with the poor in 
fundamental areas such as energy, health, financial services and education are only just 
beginning to be implemented on a large scale (see Hammond et al. 2007), opportunities exist for 
marketing researchers to be present at birth to conduct longitudinal field experiments that 
examine the impact of such offerings on the lives of the poor (see Levitt and List 2009). Such 
studies could shed light on how regulatory or technological shocks have facilitated exchange in 
emerging markets where formal exchanges did not exist before, and the moderating or mediating 
role of marketing in this process. Such quantitative studies, because they enable the researcher to 
be present from birth, and to compare outcomes in treatment relative to control groups in the 
field, offer the opportunity to make strong inferences about cause and effect in real environments 
(see Angrist and Krueger 2001). They thus leverage the internal validity of laboratory 
experiments with the external validity provided by the field setting. Such field experiments in 
emerging economies have been rare in marketing although they are gaining in influence in areas 
such as development economics and finance (see Levitt and List 2009).   
Finally, our model suggests the opportunity of combining quantitative and qualitative 
approaches by examining the role that language and discursive processes play in institutional 
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work and exchange. Various aspects of institutional work such as framing and legitimacy require 
key actors to make creative use of language (Maguire et al. 2004; Phillips et al. 2004; Zilber 
2006; Maguire and Hardy 2009). Shaping existing institutions and creating new ones often 
requires agents to persuade actors in a particular institutional setting to adopt a new system of 
meaning – a new way of thinking about a particular issue – which creates a shared sense of 
purpose and identity, and acts as a kind of social glue binding the key actors together. 
Understanding how this is done offers marketing researchers the opportunity to go beyond 
content analysis by venturing into areas such as psycholinguistics and discourse analysis in the 
study of market making (see Humphreys 2010; Yadav et al. 2007). 
Implications for practice 
In the next few decades, global economic growth will be driven by the emerging markets of 
Latin America, Africa and Asia (Mahajan 2008; Mahajan and Banga 2006). The growth of 
emerging markets will, in turn, be driven by the rise of the “next four billion” consumers as they 
make their way out of poverty into relative affluence (see Hammond et al. 2007). This large 
population of consumers offers huge opportunities for multinationals and domestic, large and 
small businesses alike. The model of exchange we develop suggests that managers of firms 
seeking to engage the poor in emerging markets would need to change at least three aspects of 
the way they go about the business of marketing.  
First, our model suggests that firms seeking to make a profit from exchanges with the poor 
will need to think systemically about how they create and maintain exchanges with such 
consumers in emerging markets. Specifically, firms will need to think about all aspects of the 
business model needed to make such exchanges sustainable in the long run. This will require 
managers not only to think about the value proposition they offer to poor consumers but also 
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about how they organize their operations in order to deliver this value proposition in a financially 
viable way. Further, delivering the value proposition will require systemic thinking around how 
to use 1) the product and price to deliver affordability to financially constrained consumers, 2) 
distribution to achieve availability and accessibility for widely dispersed markets, and 3) 
promotion to educate consumers with relatively low levels of awareness. Simply adopting 
existing practices developed for affluent consumers in developed economies will not work, given 
the significant differences in lifestyle and incomes between such consumers and those of the 
poor in emerging economies.  
Second, our model suggests that implementing the business models needed to facilitate 
exchanges with the poor in emerging markets will require more than working with the focal 
elements of exchange (the marketing mix) alone; it will also require working with the contextual, 
institutional elements that influence exchange. Specifically, firms marketing to the poor will 
need to be able to carry out the institutional work needed to enable markets to function 
effectively. This will involve learning how to frame problems and solutions appropriately, 
working to create the necessary networks, negotiating and influencing regulators and policy 
makers, and building legitimacy with investors, the media and the public at large. 
Finally, firms seeking to deliver value to the poor in emerging markets will need to approach 
this challenge with commitment and patience, and be willing to invest the necessary time and 
resources. As our model suggests, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the poor in 
emerging markets is far from easy. Finding a business model that works for both the buyer and 
the seller is hard enough; implementing the business model by doing the necessary institutional 
work is harder still. Firms hoping to commercially dominate such markets in the long run will 
have to treat these segments as more than mere beneficiaries of short-term corporate social 
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responsibility. Given the difficulty of reaching consumers with relatively low levels of awareness 
who are financially constrained and geographically dispersed, creating such markets is likely to 
involve much experimentation and failure (see Yunus, Moingeon and Lehmann-Ortega 2010).  
In sum, marketing and marketers are said to be facing a crisis concerning the strategic 
relevance of the field on one hand (see Reibstein, Day and Wind 2009; Kumar 2004; 
Varadarajan 2010; Day 1992), and its moral and social purpose on the other (Mick 2007). 
Studying how to create and maintain exchanges with the poor, with a view to better managing 
such markets and satisfying fundamental human needs, offers marketing academics and 
practitioners the opportunity to develop a renewed sense of purpose and clearly demonstrate the 
importance of the field to business and society alike.  
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Figure 1: A Framework for the Study of Exchange 
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Figure 2: An Institutional Model of Exchange in Emerging Markets 
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Table 1a: Exchange in Emerging Markets: Demand Side Market Failure 
Industry Healthcare – Ambulance Healthcare – 
Cataract-related 
blindness 
Banking / Remittances Electricity Housing FMCG 
Manifestation of market 
failure 
27% of the total deaths 
happen with no medical 
attention. 
No national equivalent of 911. 
20 million blind (80% 
is due to curable 
cataracts). 
74% of the population 
were unbanked. 
85% send remittances 
by informal methods.  
65% of East Africans lack 
access to the electricity grid. 
20% of income is spent on 
Kerosene for lighting. 
34% live in poor-quality 
housing.  
Unilever is unable to 
reach the 70% of 
India’s population.  
Country India India Kenya Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda 
and India 
Mexico, Colombia, 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica 
India 
Demand Side Reasons for Market Failure 
Demand side – Lack of 
Awareness 
Association of ambulance 
services with transportation of 
the deceased.  
 Poor consumers did not 
trust banks. 
 
 
  
  
Demand side – Lack of 
Accessibility 
Few public ambulance 
services - hence unreliable.  
Quality of care is frequently 
poor. 
Misallocation of 
resources (2/3 of the 
country’s eye care 
infrastructure is in 
urban areas) 
Informal and insecure 
methods of money 
transfer (e.g. buses, 
family and friends). 
The majority of the East 
African population is not 
connected to the electricity 
grid. 
 Only access to poor 
quality consumer 
goods.  
Demand side – Lack of 
Affordability 
Private alternatives are rare 
and expensive. 
Only state care is 
affordable to the poor, 
yet inaccessible. 
Private sector 
alternatives are 
unaffordable. 
Only formal and safe 
alternative was Western 
Union, being very 
expensive. 
The upfront cost of a solar 
lighting system is very 
expensive. 
 
Lack of capital for home 
building.  
Architects, engineers 
and builders charge high fees 
for poor quality. 
Branded regular-size 
consumer goods 
products are too 
expensive. 
Business Model 
Innovation fixing market 
failure 
Dial 1298 Aravind Eye Hospital Safaricom/Vodafone 
M-PESA 
M-KOPA/solar light in the 
paper 
Patrimonio Hoy Project Shakti 
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Table 1b: Exchange in Emerging Markets: Supply Side Market Failure 
Industry Healthcare – Ambulance Healthcare – Cataract-
related blindness 
Banking / Remittances Electricity Housing FMCG 
Manifestation of market 
failure 
27% of the total deaths 
happen with no medical 
attention. 
No national equivalent of 
911. 
20 million blind (80% is due 
to curable cataracts). 
74% of the population 
were unbanked. 
85% send remittances by 
informal methods.  
65% of East Africans 
lack access to the 
electricity grid. 
20% of income is spent 
on Kerosene for 
lighting. 
34% live in poor-quality 
housing.  
Unilever is unable to 
reach the 70% of 
India’s population.  
Country India India Kenya Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda and India 
Mexico, Colombia, 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica 
India 
Supply Side Reasons for Market Failure 
Supply side – Unaware of 
customer needs 
    CEMEX issued a 
“Declaration of Ignorance”. 
 
Supply side – Reaching 
poor consumers 
 2/3 of eye care infrastructure 
is in urban areas, where less 
than 1/3 of people live. 
Poor consumers were 
perceived as not being 
financially viable (i.e. 
banks are not reaching 
out). 
Expanding the 
electricity grid requires 
large capital 
investment. 
 Poor consumers are 
living in small villages 
scattered over a large 
area.  
Supply side – lack of 
economic means to fulfil 
exchange 
Governments and private 
sector lack the resources 
necessary to offer poor 
consumers an affordable, 
good quality and reliable 
service. 
India’s 425 district hospitals, 
each serves ca. 2 million 
people. WB estimates that 
ca. $200 million are needed 
yearly to expand the 
infrastructure to the required 
level.    
Building a network of 
branches required large 
capital investments. 
And most governments 
lack the resources 
necessary. 
High market fragmentation, 
limited buying power and 
little brand loyalty make 
serving this segment both 
complicated and costly. 
This geographical 
profile makes it very 
difficult for FMCGs to 
reach these consumers 
in an economically 
sustainable manner. 
Business Model 
Innovation fixing market 
failure 
Dial 1298 Aravind Eye Hospital Safaricom/Vodafone 
M-PESA 
M-KOPA/solar light 
in the paper 
Patrimonio Hoy Project Shakti 
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Table 2: Business Model Innovation in Emerging Markets 
Company Industry Country Type of Market Failure Business Model Innovation 
Dial 1298 Healthcare India Demand side – lack of accessibility 
Demand side – poor consumers cannot 
afford private reliable ambulance service. 
Demand side – lack of awareness 
Supply side – government’s lack of 
economic means to provide ambulance 
services for everyone 
Value for customer:  
High-quality, efficient, reliable ambulance service provider for all; single universal access 
number. Affordable pricing model; awareness campaigns in Mumbai’s slums.  
Financially viable for the company: 
Tiered pricing structure based on the patient’s ability to pay: if the patient requests to go to a 
public hospital (they pay 50% of the standard price; accident victims are transported for free). 
Community based advertisements to overcome misperceptions, additional revenues from 
advertisements on their vehicles. 
Aravind 
Eye 
Hospital 
Healthcare India Demand side – lack of accessibility  
Demand side – consumers cannot afford 
expensive eye operations 
Supply side – governments lack the 
economic means to treat poor patients for 
free; lack of social support policy 
Supply side – reaching poor consumers 
Value for customers: The level and quality of service received by paying versus non-paying 
customers is the same.  
Financially viable for the company:  
Reducing fixed cost through reproducibility (standardized process to reduce the core skills 
necessary and minimize discretionary elements; focus on eye cataract surgery). 
Price is set based on what the community can afford to pay and the hospital then works 
backwards to contain the costs. 
 Key innovation: Adopting the assembly line approach to cataract surgery.  
Safaricom 
– M-
PESA 
Banking - 
Remittances  
Kenya Demand side – Lack of trust in banks 
Demand side – lack of access to reliable 
remittance service 
Demand side – only available alternative 
was not affordable  
Supply side – reaching poor consumers  
Supply side – lack of economic means 
Value for customer: Affordable, accessible and safe mode of transferring money. 
Financially viable for the company: Increased revenues from sale of airtime; increased market 
share; building strong customer loyalty. Reduced cost by using a vast network of independent 
agents, capitalizing on big data in guaranteeing a sustained cash flow to the agent’s. Raised 50% 
of the capital investment needed through a grant from DFID. 
M-KOPA Electricity Kenya, 
Tanzania, 
Uganda 
Demand side – lack of access to electricity 
grid 
Demand side – lack of affordability 
Supply side – reaching poor consumers 
Supply side – lack of economic means to 
fulfil exchange 
Value for customer:  Solar leasing product, using mobile money. Access to electricity, not only 
for lightning, but for other devices as well. The technology helps customers build a credit history. 
Instead of customers bearing high upfront investment, M-Kopa requires a relatively small down 
payment ($34) and the rest of the cost will be paid off through daily instalments at a 20% interest 
rate (i.e. M-Kopa does not only offer solar lighting solutions, but also offers a finance solution 
that makes the product affordable. 
Financially viable for the company:   
M-Kopa saves a lot by using M-PESA as the payment system for instalments. The M-PESA sim-
card acts as a loan officer in the sense that it can automatically switch off electricity if the 
instalment payment was not made on time.  
Daily instalments initially priced close to the price of Kerosene, with the prospect of customers 
not having to pay in the future once they have paid off their debt.  
 Key Innovation: capitalizing on the availability of mobile money for paying daily instalments 
to access electricity. 
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Table 2 (continued): Business Model Innovation in Emerging Markets 
Company Industry Country Type of Market Failure Business Model Innovation 
CEMEX Cement Mexico, 
Colombia, 
Nicaragua 
and Costa 
Rica 
Demand side – lack of affordability 
Supply side – unaware of customer needs  
Supply side – reaching poor consumers 
Value for customers:  
Families participating in the scheme receive technical support and building material. Families have 
access to different financing plans, ranging from savings to micro-credit, depending on their needs. 
The cost of materials is fixed for the duration of the work, protecting customers from price 
fluctuations and other macroeconomic instability. 
CEMEX also provides storage of and vouchers for materials, should customers run into periods of 
inconsistent employment or wish to delay construction. 
Financially viable to the company:   
Income generation: service fees, demand expansion, increased brand loyalty and brand value. 
Cost reduction: discounts from participating distributors. 
Unilever – 
Project 
Shakti 
FMCG India Demand side – lack of accessibility 
Demand side – lack of affordability 
Supply side – reaching poor consumers 
Supply side – lack of economic means to 
fulfil exchange 
Value for customers: Most of the literature focuses on the opportunity created for the Shakti-
entrepreneur, one could argue that the value for customers is access to affordable high quality 
consumer goods. However, this argument has faced substantial opposition and several scholars 
have argued against how FMCGs make their products affordable to poor consumers. 
Financially viable for the company: Unilever drove down the cost of long supply chains by 
providing female entrepreneurs with access to micro-credit to purchase Unilever products and sell 
them in their villages. This is argued to be a win-win solution since project Shakti offers women 
from the local villages an employment opportunity that generates income for them and their family 
and at the same time drives down the cost of long supply chains for Unilever.  
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Table 3: Process of Institutional Change 
Institutional 
Entrepreneurship 
Dial 1298 Aravind Eye Hospital Safaricom/M-PESA M-KOPA CEMEX Unilever 
Framing The company engaged in 
a big advertising 
campaign to educate 
customers about their 
service, and gave 
ambulance services in 
Mumbai a new image. 
Starting with the 
economic economic 
strata of the 
communities as a basis 
for pricing allowed 
Aravind to be reframed 
as affordable to 
everyone.  
Nick Hughes legitimized 
his idea by securing 50% 
of the required funding 
from DFID and asking 
Vodafone to match this 
funding.  
The initial customer pilot 
and the vast customer 
data collected helped the 
company understand 
their customer needs, 
communicate with them 
and educate them about 
the product. 
CEMEX worked closely 
the Socios or promoters, 
who were trusted people 
in the communities who 
could understand the 
customer, feedback to 
CEMEX and 
communicate back to the 
customer effectively. 
The Shakti-entrepreneur 
was not only a brilliant 
channel option, but they 
also acted as brand 
ambassadors that could 
educate consumers, 
raise customer 
awareness and brand 
loyalty. 
Network 
Construction 
The company partnered 
with NGOs and funding 
bodies. (e.g. Acumen 
fund and London 
Ambulance Services) 
Aravind eye hospitals 
reached out community 
outreach programs. 
These programs usually 
sponsored by NGOs, 
businessmen and 
philanthropists. 
Internal; to counter the 
skepticism of VF’s 
TMT, he reached out to 
allies within the 
organization, that 
supported him and his 
idea. External; vast 
network of agents. 
With Nick Hughes’, 
previous experience of 
M-PESA he built a very 
strong network of allies. 
These networks helped 
M-Kopa raise funds  
and start its full launch in 
partnership with 
Safaricom. 
The business model is 
based on collaborating 
with a network of local 
distributors and local 
promotors who are 
responsible for 
advertising PH’s products 
and creating customer 
awareness. 
Partnerships with the 
district administration, 
local NGOs and a 
consulting firm were 
necessary in convincing 
the government to 
cooperate. 
Enactment of 
institutional 
arrangements 
 Collaborating with the 
IIT and n-Lounge, IT 
kiosks were set up using 
web cameras to 
remotely diagnose 
patients and give advice 
on next steps.  
Kenyan government 
issued the banking 
license for Safaricom to 
offer this service.  
Capitalizing on 
widespread mobile 
Phone penetration. 
M-Kopa took advantage 
of the institutional 
infrastructure and 
regulations in place: their 
business model would 
capitalize on the existing 
and widely spread mobile 
money technology. 
 A partnership between 
Unilever and local 
SHGs (micro-finance 
groups), enable Shakti-
entrepreneur to buy 
Unilever products to sell 
in their communities. 
Legitimation 
though collective 
action 
Indian Cricket Superstar 
Sachin Tendulkar 
launched the 1298 
Women’s 
Resource Directory. 
Aravind hospitals grew 
from 11 beds in 1976 to 
4000 beds in 2012, 
serving 0.25 million 
patients yearly. The 
hospital performs 2000 
surgeries per day which 
is 10 times the Indian 
national average. 
Increase in market share 
and strong customer 
loyalty are indications of 
the legitimacy of the 
business model.  
The company grew from 
100 customers in 2010 to 
333,000 in 2015 and 
expanded into three other 
countries (Tanzania, 
Ghana and Uganda). The 
company has been 
endorsed and recognized 
by many public figures 
such as president Obama. 
PH has reached 450 
households, improving 
the lives of more than 2 
million people. The 
project has helped poor 
households to build 3 
times faster and at 1/3 of 
the traditional cost. 
Project Shakti allowed 
Unilever to reach 
100,000 villages (3 
million households) 
across 15 regions in 
India. Sales have grown 
significantly since the 
implementation of the 
project. 
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